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Abstract
High level goals such as bandwidth provisioning, ac-
counting and network anomaly detection can be easily
met if high-volume traffic clusters are detected in real
time. This paper presents Elastic Trie, an alternative
to approaches leveraging controller-dataplane architec-
tures.
Our solution is a novel push-based network monitor-
ing approach that allows detection, within the data-
plane, of high-volume traffic clusters. Notifications from
the switch to the controller can be sent only as required,
avoiding the transmission or processing of unnecessary
data. Furthermore, the dataplane can iteratively re-
fine the responsible IP prefixes allowing a controller to
receive a flexible granularity information. We report
and discuss an evaluation of our P4-based prototype,
showing our solution to be able to detect (with 95% of
precision), hierarchical heavy hitters and superspread-
ers using less than 8KB or 80KB of active memory re-
spectively. Finally, Elastic Trie can identify changes in
the network traffic patterns, symptomatic of Denial-of-
Service attack events.
1 Introduction
The importance of finding high-volume traffic clusters
has been recognized in the past to improve network man-
agement practices [23, 20, 29, 37, 48]. Specific applica-
tions include, as shown in Table 1, accounting [21, 23],
traffic engineering [24, 6], anomaly detection [33, 34],
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), and scans detec-
tion [53, 51].
Dataplane monitoring is the main instrument that en-
ables the detection of high-volume traffic clusters. In
the past, it was based on packet sampling [16, 2], to
lower overheads and data collection bandwidth, thus
impacting estimation accuracy [14, 22, 38]. OpenFlow
(OF) [39] did not improve the situation either [20]: the
main monitoring mechanism exposes the per-port and
per-flow counters available in the switches. An appli-
cation running on top of the controller can periodically
poll counters using the standard OF APIs, and then per-
form a software-based algorithm to get insights into the
network behavior. However, this approach limits signif-
icantly the original flexibility intended by Software De-
fined Networking (SDN). While increasing the gap be-
tween two consecutive counters requests reduces the con-
troller ability to react in a timely fashion, continuously
requesting counters from switches leads to non-scalable
solutions by challenging the switch-controller interac-
tions capabilities [20]. For this reason, lately a num-
ber of proposals suggest the use of programmable data-
planes using the P4 programming language [8] to extend
dataplane functionality with more advanced monitoring
features. Specifically, some of them leverage dataplane
programmability to either directly provide the top-k
heavy hitters [48] or to assist the controller by export-
ing smart representations of aggregated traffic statis-
tics [55, 37]. While the latter case results in a more
flexible and generic approach compared to the former,
the controller still needs to receive at a fixed time inter-
val the generated information from the dataplane, and
estimate the various application-level metrics of interest
based on the received data. Such an architecture might
suffer from the same problem of the legacy OF proto-
col: the ability to apply network policy updates based
on the received data depends on the switch-controller’s
interactions capabilities of collecting statistics at short
time ranges [20].
In this paper we take a different approach. We lever-
age dataplane programmability to transform the switch
from a passive monitoring infrastructure to an active
Network event Management task
(Hierarchical)
Heavy Hitters
accounting, traffic engineering
Changes in
traffic patterns
anomaly detection, DoS detection
Superspreaders worm, scan, DDoS detection
Table 1: Detecting high-volume traffic clusters is
beneficial for a number of network management
tasks.
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system which is capable of detecting several types of net-
work events associated with high-volume traffic clusters,
and only subsequently to inform the controller. We de-
signed a new data structure, Elastic Trie, that enables
the detection of hierarchical heavy hitters, changes in
network traffic and superspreaders from within the data-
plane, and we present its implementation in P4. The ba-
sic idea behind the proposed solution is to create a hash
table based prefix tree that grows or collapses to focus
only on the prefixes that account for a ”large enough”
share of the traffic. This enables the detection of (hierar-
chical) heavy hitters, and by looking at its growing rate
it is possible to identify changes in the traffic patterns.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We propose a push-based approach to network mon-
itoring, where the dataplane informs the control
plane only when specific conditions are met.
• We present a data structure that enables the de-
tection of a number of network events associated
with high-volume traffic clusters within the data-
plane. Specifically, we demonstrate how Elastic Trie
allows to detect hierarchical heavy hitters, changes
in network traffic and superspreaders. Moreover,
our solution iteratively refines the responsible pre-
fixes so that the controller receives a finer or coarser
grained information depending on the desired re-
porting time.
• We implemented our idea in P4 using match-action
tables and we demonstrate its detection capabilities
by evaluating it through trace-driven simulations.
2 Motivating Event Triggered
Monitoring
We first ran an experiment to measure the amount of
time it takes to retrieve an increasing number of hard-
ware counters from a switch. We used two different
switches. The first is a fairly new OpenFlow-enabled
IBM solution, i.e., RackSwitch G8264 [35], capable of
1.2 Tbps throughput. The second is the NoviSwitch
1132 [42], which has been designed for use in high band-
width and flow-intensive network deployments. We con-
nected the switches to a server running an OpenFlow
controller and we built an application that allows to re-
quest an increasing number of flow counters from the
switches which were idle when the counters were pulled.
Figure 1 shows the results we obtained. Surprisingly,
the IBM switch reports values aligned with tests per-
formed against much older solutions [20], while the No-
viSwitch performs much better. We did not manage
to perform our test for more than 100K counters, but
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Figure 1: Time to retrieve hardware counters.
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Figure 2: Time to add new rules.
the increasing trend of the figure for both switches is
clear. Although dataplane programmability can help in
reducing the number of counters exported by aggregat-
ing flow rules in probabilistic data structures, such as
bloom filters or sketches, past research has shown that
around 150K counters are still required to provide use-
ful information to the controller [37]. While the IBM
switch can take up to 28 seconds to retrieve approxi-
mately half of the aforementioned amount of counters,
the NoviSwitch needs at least 5 seconds. Certainly, such
delays are not acceptable when it comes to critical net-
work events detection, e.g., DoS, DDoS, scans, worms.
The lesson learned is that retrieving a large number of
flow counters from hardware is time consuming.
Using the same configuration as in the previous ex-
periment, we ran the second test to characterize the
amount of time it takes to modify an increasing number
of rules on a high-end switch. Updating the forwarding
state and retrieving statistics from a controller are two
competing operations that are commonly performed se-
quentially by the switch. The larger the number of flow
additions or statistics requests, the bigger the impact
of one action on the completion of the other [20]. For
this reason it is important to characterize switch rule
update time, especially because issuing a large number
of forwarding updates in a single batch is a common de-
fense practice for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
stop DDoS attacks, and can involve up to 50K rules
update [25].
Figure 2 shows the results we obtained. The reported
values show a lower bound of the switch update time. In
the test we pushed an increasing number of rule modifi-
2
Figure 3: Design space for detection of high volume
traffic clusters.
cations with the same priority. This is the best case
for a switch, as demonstrated by past research [27],
as TCAMs do not have to reorder the hardware rules.
Adding 30K rules, in the best case scenario, might re-
quire 10 seconds for the IBM switch and almost 4 sec-
onds for the NoviSwitch. This would affect the statistics
collection capabilities of the controller.
The results obtained motivated us to build a solution
that: (1) does not depend on statistics retrieval from the
dataplane, and (2) decouples the monitoring and the for-
warding statistics updates. Indeed, with Elastic Trie the
controller receives a push-based notification only when
an event related to high-volume traffic clusters has been
detected in the dataplane.
3 Desired Properties
Figure 3 surveys the design space for the detection of
high volume traffic clusters and places our solution,
Elastic Trie, in context by following the thick red lines
through the design tree. This section describes the in-
sights that inform our major design decisions and pro-
vides the necessary background for the selected network
events. In designing Elastic Trie, we targeted a solution
with a number of key features:
Efficiency. Collecting counter statistics from all the
active flows or smart representations of aggregated traf-
fic statistics [55, 37] can create considerable control
plane load. With Elastic Trie, we aim for a push-based
solution which exports information to a controller only
when a network event has been detected in the data-
plane.
Packet processing independence. The main
OpenFlow mechanism for dataplane monitoring exposes
the per-port and per-flow counters available in the
switches [39]. Although this might seem a logical and
simple solution, it suffers from a major drawback: ex-
pensive TCAM resources must be shared between the
rules needed for packet processing and the rules installed
for monitoring purposes only [57]. In addition, the use
of pre-configured monitoring rules requires prior knowl-
edge of the active network flows, as well as a large num-
ber of fine grained rules, in order to accurately detect
heavy flows. With Elastic Trie, we aim to decouple the
packet processing logic from the monitoring mechanism.
While the former can still use the available TCAM re-
sources, the latter can be implemented algorithmically
with match-action tables using the P4 programming lan-
guage.
Historical network trend awareness. Change de-
tection is the process of identifying flows that contribute
the most to traffic change over two consecutive time in-
tervals [12]. Previous solutions [37, 26] rely on the con-
troller to compute the differences from multiple inter-
vals, effectively slowing down the reaction capability of
the network if an anomaly has been found. With Elas-
tic Trie, we seek a solution capable to directly compute
such an operation within the dataplane at the expense
of minimal memory consumption.
Optimization for fast traffic steering. Net-
works today rely on middleboxes to provide security and
added-value services [46]. Taking advantage of global
network knowledge of a controller, it is easy to enforce
a network policy change and steer (part of) the traf-
fic if an anomaly has been detected [44, 28]. Collecting
statistics from the dataplane, running the detection al-
gorithm in the control plane, and then enforcing a policy
change if something suspicious is found can cause delays
that might not be acceptable in the case of a network
attack. With Elastic Trie, we propose to detect at short
timescales a coarse-grained approximation of the prefix
responsible for the network traffic changes. Once the
detection of the anomalous subnet is done in the dat-
aplane, the traffic can be instantaneously redirected to
the appropriate middlebox, without the need to commu-
nicate with the controller.
Optimization for network management. Divid-
ing the time in fixed intervals can simplify the detec-
tion of a number of network events, e.g., heavy hit-
ter, superspreader, DDoS. At the end of each time win-
dow, it is possible to identify the flows that consume
more than a fraction T of the link capacity, i.e., heavy
hitter, or determine the host that contacts more than
a number of unique destinations, i.e., superspreader.
For this reason, current solutions for network monitor-
ing typically operate by exporting counters or specific
data structures, e.g., sketches, to the controller at fixed
time scales [54, 37, 36]. However, this approach tightly
bounds the reactive capabilities of the network with the
dataplane statistics reporting time, as it needs to be (at
least) comparable to traffic variations [3, 6]. Only if this
last condition is met, solutions like dynamic routing of
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heavy flows [20, 6, 45] or dynamic flow scheduling [47]
can be easily implemented. However, state of the art so-
lutions adopt a fairly large reporting time (typically 20
seconds [37, 48]) not to overload the controller with too
much data, thus limiting network reaction capabilities.
With Elastic Trie, we target a solution that iteratively
refines the responsible prefixes in the dataplane. In this
way, the controller, depending on the desired reporting
time, can receive finer or coarser grained information on
the flow responsible for a network event associated with
a high-volume traffic cluster.
3.1 Selected Network Events
This section provides the necessary background for the
network events considered in this paper.
(H)HH detection. Hierarchical Heavy Hitters have
already been studied in a number of prior works [58, 19,
29, 40, 13, 4]. Detecting an Heavy Hitter (HH) means
identifying a large aggregate in the network traffic. For
example, assuming the use of the source IP address as
a key, the goal of the HH detection problem is to find
the source IP prefixes that contribute with a traffic vol-
ume1 larger than a given threshold T during a fixed
time interval t. Figure 4 depicts the amount of traffic
for prefixes in a reduced 3-bit wide model domain of IP
addresses. All of the prefixes are denoted as a prefix
tree, also known as trie. Each node of the trie has at
most two children. The left child is associated with bit
value 0, while the right child is associated with bit value
1, and the prefix p represented by a node is defined by
the path from the root to that node. Terminal nodes
express only the traffic volume produced by full IP ad-
dresses. Non-terminal nodes then summarize the traffic
of a prefix. The contribution of each prefix is repre-
sented as a number in each node. Considering the use
of a threshold T = 10, terminal nodes 010, 100, non-
terminal node 11* and all their ancestors are identified
as heavy hitters. For example, each child of the 11*
node contributes independently less than the threshold
T , but in total both children contribute enough to ex-
ceed the threshold and report the 11* prefix as a HH.
A Hierarchical Heavy Hitter (HHH) [19] is a special
case of HH. Specifically, it is a prefix p, which exceeds
a threshold T after excluding the contribution of all its
HHH descendants2. In Figure 4, only prefixes 010, 100,
0** and 11* are HHHs. The amount of traffic of each
HH prefix without the impact of its HHH descendants
is shown in brackets. In this example, the 11* node is
an HHH, as none of its children contributes enough to
exceed the threshold T , but the amount of traffic from
both children exceeds the threshold. In contrast, the
1It can be considered in terms of packets or bytes per second.
2The descendant prefixes need to satisfy the definition of HHH.
Figure 4: A trie of IP addresses in reduced 3-bit
model. Each node represents a prefix p with asso-
ciated amount of traffic sent. Assuming threshold
T = 10, grey nodes are heavy hitters, while double
circle nodes are also hierarchical heavy hitters.
1** prefix is not an HHH because a significant part of
its contribution originates from its descendant nodes 100
and 11*, which are already HHH and must be excluded.
It is worth noting that, while the detection of HHHs
requires the knowledge of the HHs, the opposite is not
true. Reporting to a controller the HHHs guarantees
minimum overhead, while providing all the necessary
information. Taking as an example the configuration of
Figure 4, a dataplane capable of detecting HHs would
export to the controller the following prefixes: 0**,
1**, 01*, 10*, 11*, 010 and 100. In contrast, a dat-
aplane with HHH detection capability would report just
0**, 11*, 010 and 100. In both cases the amount of
useful information for network management practices is
the same3, but in the second case we export less data.
Change detection. Traffic anomalies are a normal
occurrence in the daily life of network operators. While
some of them can be sometimes tolerable, others are of-
ten an indication of performance bottlenecks due to flash
crowds [30], network element failures, or malicious ac-
tivities such as Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS), worms
and spam. Change detection is one of the main ap-
proach to network anomaly detection. The method de-
tects traffic anomalies by deriving a model of normal
behavior based on the past traffic history and looking
for significant changes in short-term behavior that are
inconsistent with the model [32]. Identifying the flows
responsible for the changes in the traffic patterns can
be formulated also (at least in part) as a high-volume
traffic clusters detection problem [23]. Specifically, it re-
quires the ability to discover which flows contribute the
most to the traffic changes over two consecutive time
intervals [12].
Superspreader detection. A superspreader is de-
fined to be a host that contacts at least a given num-
ber of distinct destinations over a short time period. It
3Some of the reported HHs are just prefixes of more specific
HHs.
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can be responsible for fast worm propagation, so detect-
ing it early is of paramount importance [52]. Moreover,
superspreader detection can be seen as a high-volume
traffic cluster identification problem. Specifically, while
past examples, such as HH, typically define the traffic
volume in terms of packets or bytes per second, in the
case of superspreaders, the problem is tackled in the di-
mension of flows per second. While an HH is a source
that sends a lot of traffic, a superspreader is a source
that contacts many distinct destinations. In addition,
superspreader detection can be seen also as Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) victim detection if, instead of
the source, the same type of spread detection is applied
to the destination [55].
4 Elastic Trie Algorithm
The Elastic Trie algorithm is inspired by past works
on HHH detection [58, 29]. Specifically, it operates in
the same hierarchical manner. It also enables the de-
tection of a number of network events associated with
high-volume traffic clusters from within the dataplane
without the need to be coordinated by a controller. Fi-
nally, it operates in a packet-driven manner and can be
implemented using common match-action based archi-
tectures such as RMT [9].
In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we first intro-
duce a basic version of the Elastic Trie which is capable
to detect only HHHs. We then describe its mapping into
appropriate P4 constructs, e.g., match-action tables and
registers. Finally, we discuss extensions to the basic al-
gorithm to support the detection of other events, such
as superspreaders and network traffic changes.
4.1 Data Structure & Basic Algorithm
Let us assume that we know in advance all the poten-
tial HHHs in a network. In this case, to correctly de-
tect which of them is a real HHH, for each new arriv-
ing packet it is necessary to lookup the longest prefix
matching (LPM) in the table of potential HHHs and
then increment its associated counter. Thus, in some
aspects, this is similar to the IP lookup problem [49],
where the longest prefix matching in the forwarding ta-
ble is searched. In practice, the two problems, while
sharing some common aspects, are quite different. In the
first case, the forwarding table is computed by the con-
trol plane, does not directly depend on the nature of the
dataplane traffic and does not change very frequently. In
contrast, a table storing HHHs is very dynamic, as it is
correlated with the properties of the dataplane traffic.
In addition, since the HHH prefixes are not known in
advance, all the traffic received needs to be monitored
to properly build the corresponding HHHs table.
The nature of the HHH problem (IP addresses can be
naturally organized according to prefixes into a hierar-
chy) led us to use a tree-based data structure. Thus, for
the purpose of HHH detection we maintain a standard
trie data structure [49]. A trie is a tree data structure,
where the position of a node in the tree defines the key
associated with it. Every node in a trie has at most
two child nodes4. The left child is associated with bit
value 0, and the right child is associated with bit value
1. Each node also represents a prefix, which is defined
by the path from the root of the tree to that specific
node. With Elastic Trie, we further extend this concept
and associate a specific data structure within each node.
Specifically, it consists of three elements: the counter as-
sociated to the left child (32 bits), the one associated
to the right child (32 bits) and a timestamp (48 bits).
The counters represent the amount of traffic, e.g., pack-
ets or bytes, for each of the node’s direct subprefix, while
the sum of the counters represents the amount of traffic
sent by the prefix itself. The timestamp specifies the
time when the node was created or the last time when
the counters were reset.
The starting condition is associated to a trie composed
by a single node, corresponding with the zero-length pre-
fix *. The basic idea behind the proposed solution is
to have a trie that grows or collapses to focus on the
nodes associated to prefixes that account for a ”large
enough” share of the traffic. Thus, we named our data
structure Elastic Trie. To achieve this, inspired by the
NetFlow [16] terminology, we defined two time intervals:
active timeout tA and inactive timeout tI , where tA < tI .
The active timeout tA is the interval after which the
prefix is evaluated and possibly reported as HHH to the
controller. The inactive timeout tI defines the interval
after which the IP prefix corresponding to the node is
considered inactive and its counters outdated. Figure 5
depicts key steps of the proposed Elastic Trie algorithm.
For every incoming packet, the longest prefix (thus its
corresponding node) is looked up and the packet times-
tamp (tP ) compared against the node timestamp (tN ).
Let us also denote by c0 and c1 the left and the right
child counters of the found node. Here, there are five
possible cases that have to be considered based on the
result of the comparison, the node counter values, time-
outs tA and tI :
Invalidating the node. If the inactive timeout tI
expires (tI ≤ tP − tN ), it means the prefix node has
been inactive for a long time. The values of the coun-
ters are outdated and are not relevant for the detec-
tion any more. This can happen when the source prefix
stops sending packets for a while. Because the detec-
tion is built on a packet-driven basis this can not be de-
4For the sake of simplicity let us now ignore the multi-bit tries.
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Figure 5: Flowchart showcasing input packet pro-
cessing of the Elastic Trie detection algorithm.
tected easily in the dataplane. Thus, the inactive time-
out mechanism helps to handle this situation when the
packets of the source prefix start to flow again and when
the old values must be invalidated. Figure 6a illustrates
this case. Regardless of the counter values, the tree node
is simply removed and the counter values discarded.
Expanding the node. This is the case when both
the active and inactive timeouts have not expired yet
(tP − tN < tA < tI), but one of the node counters (let
us assume, for example, c0) exceeds the threshold T that
the system uses to discriminate heavy prefixes (c0 ≥ T ).
In this case, the subprefix associated with c0 can be
(optionally) reported to the controller as HH but not as
HHH yet. Figure 6b depicts this case: the data structure
automatically starts the refinement of the prefix (10*)
by creating a new child node (100) corresponding to c0.
According to the definition of HHH, the original c0 must
be set to zero to remove the contribution of the newly
created descendant prefix. Since, we also do not have
any records for the newly created child yet, the new
node will have its timestamp set to the current packet
timestamp and both its counters set to zero.
Keeping the node. This is the case when the inac-
tive timeout tI has not expired, but the active timeout
tA has expired (tA ≤ tP − tN < tI), and the sum of
both counters exceeds the threshold T (c0 + c1 ≥ T ),
but none of the counters contributes enough to reach
the threshold individually (c0 < T ; c1 < T ). This case
is shown in Figure 6c. When such a condition happens,
the prefix corresponding to the node (11*) is a HHH, be-
cause it exceeds the threshold T and none of its children
contributes enough to exceed to threshold individually.
The prefix then is reported to the controller, its times-
tamp updated with the packet timestamp value and the
counters are reset to prepare the node for the evaluation
in next time interval.
Collapsing the node. If the inactive timeout tI
has not expired yet, the active timeout tA has expired
(tA ≤ tP − tN < tI) and the sum of both counters does
not exceed the threshold T (c0 + c1 < T ), the node can
be collapsed. This case is depicted in Figure 6d. The
node (10*) is removed from the tree structure, and it is
replaced by the nearest parent. Both the counters of the
parent node (1**) are zeroed and the timestamp is set to
the current packet timestamp. Also note the difference
between collapsing and invalidation of the node. In the
case of invalidation the nearest parent is not reinserted
or renewed.
Updating the node counter. This is the only ac-
tion which is performed when both the active and inac-
tive timeouts have not expired yet (tP − tN < tA < tI)
and none of the node counters exceed the threshold T
(c0 < T ; c1 < T ). In this scenario, the node counter
corresponding to the packet subprefix is updated5 and
the trie structure does not change. Note the counter is
also updated after other actions when the node is kept,
expanded or collapsed. In these cases the newly created
node or the nearest parent node counters are updated
instead of the current node counter.
4.2 Elastic Trie Prototype in P4
This section discusses the implementation of Elastic Trie
on programmable hardware, using the P416 specification
version 1.0.0 [18]. Figure 7 depicts a high-level view of
the architecture and illustrates the operations performed
for each incoming packet. The structure is organized
around three main building blocks: (A) the LPM clas-
sification stage, (B) the main memory used to gather
traffic statistics alongside related timestamps and (C)
the control logic to dynamically adjust the hierarchical
data structure and to report (partial) results of the de-
tection to the external controller.
Each incoming packet is first parsed to extract the
desired flow key, i.e., source IP6. Then, the hierarchical
tree structure is accessed to find the LPM (step 1). The
result of this stage is an address that is used to access
the main memory, where the data structure of the as-
sociated node is stored (step 2). The reported values
are thus compared with the packet timestamp (step 3)
and the appropriate operation is computed (step 4) fol-
lowing the Elastic Trie specifications described in the
previous section. Specifically, the comparison can trig-
ger an update of the main memory (step 4a), an update
of the LPM classification scheme (step 4b), or a push
notification to the external controller (step 4c). In the
following, we provide a more detailed description of the
mapping between the three main building blocks and
P416 match-action constructs.
5Depending on the trie configuration, the counters might carry
information about bytes or number of packets.
6While Elastic Trie is oblivious with respect to the specific
packet field used as flow key, the source IP address is commonly
used for the HH and HHHs detection.
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(a) Invalidating the node. (b) Expanding the node. (c) Keeping the node. (d) Collapsing the node.
Figure 6: The core cases of Elastic Trie refinement, assuming the threshold T = 10. Each node represents a
prefix and builds the data structure. Node counters are shown in brackets on the sides.
Figure 7: Elastic Trie dataplane architecture.
LPM classification stage. Although P4 offers
built-in match tables supporting LPM, we could not uti-
lize them for implementation of the trie structure, since
the latest P4 specification does not support modifica-
tions of these tables directly from the dataplane, even
though some targets like FPGAs may support it. As
this feature is essential for our architecture, we opted
for a custom LPM implementation. We use a hash ta-
ble for each prefix length (Figure 8), thus requiring 32
hash tables to support each IPv4 prefix7. Each hash
table is implemented as a register array. Upon packet
arrival, all the hash tables are read in parallel, by hash-
ing the associated prefix of the flow key. We use hash
extern API with CRC32 as an algorithm to generate hash
values to access the registers. Hash tables referring to
short prefix values usually require less memory, as they
need to store information for a smaller number of results.
Thus, depending on the amount of memory allocated to
each hash table, we use a direct access based only on the
prefix value itself (so called IDENTITY hash algorithm in
P4 API) for some of the shortest prefix tables. Each
individual hash table lookup result can then be repre-
sented as a single bit value, 1 (found), 0 (not found)
respectively. Using bitwise operators we put these bits
7Using less hash tables and supporting only a subset of prefixes
comes at the cost of node complexity. Indeed, each node needs to
store a counter for each associated subprefix. This means that if
we use only hash tables for just the prefixes \8, \16, \24 and \32,
we need to construct nodes with 256 counters each.
Figure 8: The LPM classification stage in P4.
together to form a bitvector, which serves as an input
key into a static ternary match table that implements a
structure similar to a priority encoder.
Main memory access mechanic stage. The hash
value of the resulting LPM is used as address to access
a register array that stores the required node structure
information for that specific prefix, i.e., two packet coun-
ters and a timestamp. We use 32-bit wide packet coun-
ters and 48-bit wide timestamp as it is available in the
packet metadata structure in P4. To detect hash colli-
sions in our implementation of LPM classification stage
in P4, we further extended the node data structure with
a up to 32-bit wide flow key field (IPv4 prefix). Note
that we do not need to store the prefix length because
we use a separate hash table for each length. Thus, the
size of each node structure is 144 bits (112 bits for the
node and 32 bits for the IP address). Then, in the case of
a hash collision, the nearest shorter prefix node is used
instead of the reported LPM.
Control logic. This last stage compares the packet
timestamp with the node timestamp and applies the
logic described in Section 4.1. The node collapse or ex-
pansion is performed by updating the appropriate hash
table storing the specific prefix that needs to be ad-
justed, while the push-based mechanic is implemented
by generating a packet digest (digest extern object in
P4 API) containing the IP prefix detected as HH or
HHH alongside its node information such as the sum of
the counters and the timestamp. The controller does not
directly participate on the trie refinement and receives
only generated messages. Thus, for further evaluation
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of the control logic and using an available API of P4 be-
havioral model [17] we also implemented a lightweight
command line tool in Python to receive and dump re-
ported (H)HH prefixes.
4.3 Enhanced algorithm
In this part we introduce three further extensions of
the basic algorithm described in the previous section.
First, we address the support for the detection of other
network events, i.e., superspreaders and network traffic
changes. Second, we provide an optimization that ac-
celerates the trie building process, thus improving the
reactiveness of our solution.
Superspreaders detection. As introduced in sec-
tion 3.1, a superspreader is defined to be a host that
contacts at least a given number of distinct destinations
over a short time period. Thus, to enable such a de-
tection, it is important to keep track of the number of
destinations contacted by each source prefix. To address
this challenge we used a standard Bloom filter [7], which
is a memory-efficient probabilistic data structure com-
monly used to test for set membership. Specifically, we
deployed the filter in parallel to the main memory to test
if a packet belongs to a new unique flow or not. The key
to index the filter consists of the source IP prefix looked
up during LPM classification phase and destination IP
address of the packet. The control logic to dynamically
adjust the hierarchical structure is kept the same as in
the basic algorithm, however, a test-and-set operation
on the filter is performed for each incoming packet and
the appropriate node counters are updated only if a new
unique flow is detected. This change to the architecture
allows the detection of (hierarchical) superspreaders us-
ing the Elastic Trie data structure. Moreover, the Bloom
filter can be easily implemented in P4 as a bit array
placed in a register and a set of k hash functions.
Change detection. The common way to detect
changes in the traffic patterns is based on deriving a
model of normal behavior based on the past traffic his-
tory and looking for significant changes in short-term be-
havior that are inconsistent with the model itself. One of
the desired properties for Elastic Trie was to be histori-
cal network trend aware (Section 3). Indeed, by tracking
the number of nodes expanded or collapsed over an ac-
tive timeout interval tA, it is possible to spot sudden
changes. To enable such a detection, we added a global
timestamp register and an integer counter which is in-
cremented and decremented when any node of the tree
is expanded or collapsed, respectively. When the traffic
is steady, the number of nodes expanded and collapsed
should be similar and the value of the counter should
vary around zero. Otherwise, if the value of the counter
is above or below a specified threshold, it denotes a sig-
nificant change in short-term traffic behavior which is
reported to the controller using a digest message.
Variable active timeout. The starting condition
for our data structure is associated to a trie composed by
a single node, corresponding with the zero-length pre-
fix *. Depending on the packet flow, the trie is then
built to focus on the heavy prefixes. Although the re-
finement process, as explained in Section 4.1, does not
depend on the selected active timeout, the node eval-
uation8, with the potential reporting to the controller,
does. This means that in the worst case scenario a full
IP address can be reported after 32 × tA seconds: the
upper bound for building the tree from the root to the
lowest level. To mitigate this, we propose a variable
active timeout mechanism which sets different timeout
intervals and corresponding thresholds for nodes of dif-
ferent prefix length, i.e., smaller timeout and threshold
for shorter prefixes and vice versa. In the P4 imple-
mentation we can use separate configuration registers of
active timeout and threshold for each level of the tree
depending on the prefix length.
5 Evaluation
Following a common practice adopted for the evaluation
of programmable dataplane solutions [37, 48], we imple-
mented a C++ simulation model of the Elastic Trie al-
gorithm to assess our approach against real traffic traces
from an ISP backbone and a datacenter network. Ad-
ditionally, using the behavioral model available for P4
switches [17], we also verified the correctness of our P4
prototype by comparing its results against the outputs
generated by the C++ simulation model.
In this section, we first describe our setup and we
evaluate the trade-offs of the Elastic Trie data structure.
Then, we discuss its detection accuracy against the sup-
ported network events (hierarchical heavy hitters, su-
perspreaders and traffic changes) when varying memory
occupancy, type of the input traffic and data structure
configuration parameters. Finally, we conclude by com-
paring it with prior related solutions.
Traces. For the ISP backbone test case, we used four
one-hour packet traces from CAIDA [10, 11] recorded
from 10 Gbps links in San Jose and Chicago in 2009 and
2016, respectively. All CAIDA traces are distributed in
one minute chunks, and each chunk contains on average
30M packets with around 840K unique IP addresses. As
for datacenter network test case, we used the publicly
available traces from 2009 [5]. These are 65 and 160 min-
utes long and contain about 20M and 100M packets, re-
spectively, both with around 5.5K unique IP addresses.
Unfortunately, we could not use the newer datacenter
8 The process of deciding if a specific prefix is a HH or HHH.
8
traces from the Facebook Network Analytics Data Shar-
ing program [1], as they were collected using sampling,
which makes them inappropriate for the type of tests
needed in this paper.
Setup. Following common practices from past re-
search efforts [37, 48] we set the fixed active timeout tA
to 20 seconds (measurement reporting time) and the in-
active timeout tI to 5 minutes. The threshold T , used
to discriminate the prefixes that are ”large enough”,
has been set to be 1%, 5% and 10% of the maximum
amount of traffic (packets or flows). As for the variable
active timeout behavior (discussed in Section 4.3), when
adopted, we set it differently for each trie level. The set
fy(x) of functions (1) specifies the value of the timeout
for each of the trie level x. The coefficient y indicates
the number of levels not being affected. For example, a
value of 16 for y means that the first half of the trie is
built using variable active timeout and the second one
with a fixed timeout.
fy(x) =
{
y
32−x tA, if
y
32−x < 1;
tA, otherwise
(1)
This set of functions allows to have smaller timeouts
for shorter prefixes, thus enabling a fine-grained control
over the reporting time and the trie building capabilities.
The shorter the timeouts, the smaller the amount of
traffic needed to start the process of trie building, since
the threshold T is fixed.
Metrics. To better understand the dynamics of the
proposed data structure, we evaluated the number of
nodes and the trie depth varying a number of con-
figuration parameters. Then, to estimate its network
event detection capabilities, we used two common met-
rics [19, 29]: recall and precision. Recall (2) is defined as
the number of real events reported over the total ground
truth events happened. In contrast, precision (3) repre-
sents the total ground truth events happened over the
total reported. Specifically, the recall and precision are
the complements to the number of false negatives fN
and false positives fP : the higher the recall the smaller
the false negatives rate, while the higher the precision
the smaller the false positives rate.
recall = real-events-reportedground-truth-events-happened = 1− fN (2)
precision = ground-truth-events-happenedevents-reported = 1− fP (3)
Unless otherwise stated, the recall and precision are al-
ways indicated as the average over the chunks of the
traces.
5.1 Data structure properties
Figures 9a show Elastic Trie average depth and average
number of nodes over time for CAIDA traces varying the
threshold. The threshold T was set to 1%, 5% and 10%
of the amount of traffic in terms of packets. The depth
and number of nodes are as expected proportional to the
selected threshold: the lower the threshold, the larger
the depth and the number of nodes, since more prefixes
are detected as heavy. It is also possible to see the learn-
ing phase of the trie at the beginning of the trace, when
the trie has to build up from the less specified prefix.
After this phase, the trie reaches a steady state that re-
flects the current traffic behavior. Figures 9b offer, for
the threshold of 5%, a more detailed view on the learn-
ing phase and compare the impact of variable active
timeout for different functions. Using a variable active
timeout mechanism, we can speed up the learning phase
by 93%, going from 300 seconds needed for fixed timeout
to 20 seconds needed using the most aggressive function
f1(x). As a counterpart, very aggressive functions are
much more sensitive to traffic patterns, resulting in po-
tential fluctuations of the trie. The last Figures 9c show
the behavior of Elastic Trie in a datacenter environment.
In contrast with ISP traces, datacenter traces are much
more bursty, directly influencing the behavior of the trie.
5.2 HHH detection
In this section we first present the theoretical HHH de-
tection capabilities, then our implementation driven re-
sults. The former case does not take into account the im-
pact of implementation details such as amount of avail-
able memory or potential hash collisions. This allows
us to get an understanding about the behavior of our
solution in the best case scenario. The latter takes into
account limitations in memory availability, as well as
potential hash collisions that might happen during the
classification stage. This allows us to get an understand-
ing of the trade-offs between memory and detection re-
sults.
Theoretical results. Figure 10a and 10b show the
HHH detection capabilities in a ISP and a datacenter
scenario, respectively. We used a threshold of 5%.
Since the basic behavior of Elastic Trie is to build a
trie that focuses on the prefixes that account for a large
share of the traffic, sometimes it might happen that the
system is not quick enough in finalizing the building
process when the prefix needs to be reported. Due to
this, we define two ways of comparing the prefixes de-
tected: exact prefix comparison and relaxed comparison,
where we accept as a valid result a 2 bit coarser grained
version of the prefix. The figures show that the accu-
racy with exact prefix detection is lower than its 2 bit
coarser grained prefix version. Overall, both recall and
precision are always between 90% and 100%. The effect
of variable active timeout can be seen in Figure 10a.
When using a more aggressive variable timeout the re-
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Figure 9: Trie depth and number of nodes varying threshold, timeout behavior and type of traffic.
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Figure 10: HHH detection capabilities varying active
timeout behavior and type of traffic.
call increases, leading to a smaller false negative rate.
In contrast, the precision decreases causing higher false
positives rate. This is a direct effect of smaller active
timeouts that lead the system to detect more prefixes.
Using different functions for variable active timeout, it
is then possible to fine tune the trade-off between recall
and precision.
In a datacenter scenario, as shown in Figures 10b, re-
sults are less accurate. This is caused by the bursty
nature of datacenter traffic, which means it is more dif-
ficult for the trie to build up in time. It is then clear
that our solution is more suitable for an ISP scenario.
Implementation driven results. We assess the im-
pact of the amount of available memory over the recall
and precision. We find that our solution can successfully
detect, with approximately 65% recall and 85% preci-
sion, the exact HHH prefix using a fixed active timeout
and less than 20KB (Figure 11a). If a coarser grained
prefix is used, which is less precise by only two bits,
then the recall jumps to 80% and the precision to 98%.
Again, this is the consequence of the nature of the data
structure: it might happen that it does not have enough
time to build properly.
Using a variable timeout (Figure 11b) results improve
sensibly. In this case, it is possible to detect the exact
HHH prefix with 85% recall and 90% precision with less
than 8KB. Moreover, if a 2 bit coarser grained HHH pre-
fix is used, the recall jumps to 95% and the precision to
98%. Increasing the available memory does not signifi-
cantly improve the detection capabilities of the system,
because it is theoretically bounded by the ability of the
trie to react and build up according to the input traffic
patterns.
In Figure 12, we compare the HHH detection capabil-
ities of Elastic Trie against related prior programmable
dataplane based solutions: UnivMon [37] and Hash-
Pipe [48]. UnivMon and HashPipe use an alternative
definition for HH detection, named the “top-k problem”.
Instead of reporting prefixes that are larger than a given
threshold, they report the top-k sources, no matter the
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Figure 12: Comparison between Elastic Trie, UnivMon, and Hashpipe
of Hierarchical Heavy Hitter detection capabilities in ISP scenario.
amount of traffic they are actually sending. To per-
form a fair comparison, and align their results with the
one produced by our system (which follows the classic
HHH definition), we aggregated their output addresses
into prefixes and considered only the ones that carry
traffic beyond the fixed threshold T . Figures 12a and
12b show the results using an exact prefix compari-
son. HashPipe needs a much lower amount of mem-
ory (∼144KB) than UnivMon (∼800KB) to reach recall
and precision around 50-60%. In contrast, Elastic Trie
significantly outperforms both of the solutions. The in-
accuracies spotted in UnivMon and HashPipe can be
partially related to the different definition of heavy hit-
ters being used. This is also confirmed by the results
obtained when a coarser grained prefix is used (Fig-
ures 12c and 12d). Nevertheless, the memory require-
ments of the three solutions represent a fair comparison
metric. HashPipe and Elastic Trie have the same mem-
ory requirements, but HashPipe can only detect Heavy
Hitters, while our solution adds more network events.
UniMon is not restricted to a single network event, but
requires 90% more memory to work.
5.3 Superspreader detection
As in the HHH case, we first introduce the theoretical
results (without taking into account available memory
or hash collisions). Then, we show the trade-offs be-
tween memory occupancy and superspreader detection
capabilities.
Theoretical results. Figure 13a shows the theoret-
ical superspreader detection recall and precision capa-
bilities for CAIDA traces varying the active timeout be-
havior. In contrast to the same evaluation for HHH de-
tection, Elastic Trie superspreader detection, using vari-
able timeout, is less good at detecting the exact prefix
length than when using a fixed timeout. In this case,
it is clearer that the trie cannot build in time, as both
recall and precision grow sensibly when we use a 2 bit
coarser grained superspreader prefix. Overall, for fixed
active timeout the detection capabilities are still good,
as both recall and precision are around 80% and 95%.
Implementation driven results. In Figure 13b we
show the impact of available memory over the detection
capabilities, taking into account our P4 implementation.
For this test, we used a fixed active timeout, fixed 25KB
of memory for the allocation of the prefix trie struc-
ture, and we varied the Bloom filter occupancy. We find
that superspreaders can be successfully detected with
approximately 60% recall and 85% precision and 78%
recall and 98% precision when a 2 bit coarser grained
prefix is used, respectively, with less than 250KB of al-
located memory.
5.4 Change detection
To demonstrate traffic change detection capabilities of
Elastic Trie structure, we artificially injected network
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Figure 13: Superspreader detection capabilities.
traffic simulating DoS attack and scanning into one of
the CAIDA traces. The attack has been emulated after
2500 seconds since the beginning of the trace. DoS and
scanning are two type of attacks that can potentially
change traffic patterns. At the same time, they are also
pretty different: while a DoS is typically a source that
sends a huge amount of traffic to a designated victim, the
scan is a source contacting many random destinations.
Figure 14a shows the time on the x-axis and a moving
average of trie changes (difference between number of
expanded and collapsed nodes) on the y-axis. Note that
tree is built based on HHH detection using a fixed active
timeout tA = 20 seconds. In the figure we can distinctly
see differences during normal conditions and the state
under DoS attack or scan. After a learning phase, our
data structure can be used to verify if the input traffic
patterns suddenly change. Figure 14b shows the same
situation but from a different perspective. Now the trie
is built on top of the superspreader detection. In this
case, the DoS attack is not detected at all, because it
represents a communication with only one distinct des-
tination. On the other hand, the scan, as a typical case
of superpreader, is much more significant now. The last
Figure 14c shows the situation based again on HHH de-
tection, but using the variable active timeout mecha-
nism. Due to accelerated trie construction, there are
many more changes in the trie over a short time period.
This allows to highlight further even small changes in
the traffic patterns, as shown when comparing the scan
behavior for Figure 14a and Figure 14c.
6 Related Work
SDN-based monitoring solutions which rely on statistics
retrieval from switches [50, 54, 15] might suffer from lim-
ited visibility. As demonstrated in Section 2, this can
be a very expensive process, that can overload either the
controller or the switch itself. In contrast, our solution
reports to the controller the network events of interest
as soon as they happen, without the need of a central
controller. To have flexibility in identifying the interest-
ing flows, iterative refinement of monitored flows can be
used, which can be costly for the control channel, since
it requires flow updates to zoom in the traffic of inter-
est [29, 57, 41]. While our architecture also relies on
iterative refinement when building the trie to focus on
the flows of interest, it does so in the data plane, with no
direct intervention from the control plane. Algorithms
that use iterative refinement of flows to determine heavy
hitters and anomalies were presented in [56] and [31], re-
spectively, but they were targeted for custom measure-
ment platforms (not match-action type architecture).
More recently, a number of monitoring frameworks
leveraging P4 programmability have been developed [36,
37, 48, 43]. FlowRadar [36] keeps track of all the flows
in the network and their counters, and exports this in-
formation periodically to a remote collector, which de-
codes it and uses it for various monitoring applications
targeted to datacenters. Our aim is to not keep track
of all the flows in the network as FlowRadar does, but
to be able to efficiently detect network events related to
high-volume traffic clusters from within the dataplane.
UnivMon [37] uses a general sketch in the dataplane to
keep track of the flows, which offers information for sev-
eral monitoring applications, and is exported at fixed
time intervals to the control plane. HashPipe [48] deter-
mines the top-k heavy hitters in the dataplane, and ex-
ports them at fixed time intervals. Our work informs the
controller as soon as the considered network events take
place, without having to wait for the end of the time in-
terval. Sonata [26], which proposes a query interface for
network telemetry, uses sketches in the dataplane, and
zooms-out the network traffic of interest by refining the
network query, starting from the finest level. The query
refinement is done by the controller, who programs the
new query plan on the target in each iteration, while
in our case, the refinement is done directly in the dat-
aplane. While [43] presents a solution for determining
hierarchical heavy hitters directly from the dataplane,
their solution does not cover other measurements tasks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a push-based approach to
network monitoring, where the dataplane informs the
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Figure 14: Change detection capabilities varying active timeout and trie building behavior.
control plane only when specific conditions are met. To
achieve this, we presented a new data structure, Elas-
tic Trie, that enables the detection of a number of net-
work events associated with high-volume traffic clusters
within the dataplane. Our solution has been designed
with the constraints of emerging programmable switches
in mind, as it works in a packet-driven manner, and can
be implemented using common match-action based ar-
chitectures such as RMT.
Elastic Trie uses a hash table based prefix tree that
grows or collapses to focus only on the prefixes that
account for a ”large enough” share of the traffic. This
enables the detection of (hierarchical) heavy hitters, and
by looking at its growing rate it is possible to identify
changes in the traffic patterns. We prototype our solu-
tion with P4 and demonstrate its detection capabilities.
Specifically, using simulation on real traffic traces taken
from an ISP backbone and a datacenter, we showed that
Elastic Trie achieves high accuracy in detecting hierar-
chical heavy hitters, superpreaders and changes in the
network traffic patterns with the memory constraints
imposed by today’s switches.
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